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Linear Quadratic Mean Field Games: Asymptotic
Solvability and Relation to the Fixed Point
Approach
Minyi Huang and Mengjie Zhou
Abstract—Mean field game theory has been developed largely
following two routes. One of them, called the direct approach,
starts by solving a large-scale game and next derives a set
of limiting equations as the population size tends to infinity.
The second route is to apply mean field approximations and
formalize a fixed point problem by analyzing the best response
of a representative player. This paper addresses the connection
and difference of the two approaches in a linear quadratic
(LQ) setting. We first introduce an asymptotic solvability notion
for the direct approach, which means for all sufficiently large
population sizes, the corresponding game has a set of feedback
Nash strategies in addition to a mild regularity requirement.
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic
solvability and show that in this case the solution converges to
a mean field limit. This is accomplished by developing a re-
scaling method to derive a low dimensional ordinary differential
equation (ODE) system, where a non-symmetric Riccati ODE has
a central role. We next compare with the fixed point approach
which determines a two point boundary value (TPBV) problem,
and show that asymptotic solvability implies feasibility of the
fixed point approach, but the converse is not true. We further
address non-uniqueness in the fixed point approach and examine
the long time behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati ODE in the
asymptotic solvability problem.
Index Terms—Asymptotic solvability, direct approach, fixed
point approach, linear quadratic, mean field game, re-scaling,
Riccati differential equation.
I. INTRODUCTION
MEAN field game (MFG) theory has undergone a phe-nomenal growth. It provides a powerful methodology
for tackling complexity in large-population noncooperative
decision problems. The readers are referred to [4], [7], [9],
[12], [20] for an overview of the theory and applications. The
past developments have largely followed two routes [28], [29],
[36] which are called, respectively, the bottom-up and top-
down approaches in [7].
One route starts by formally solving an N-player game to
obtain a large coupled solution equation system. The next
step is to derive a limit for the solution by taking N → ∞
[36], which can be called the direct (or bottom up) approach;
see route one in Fig. 1. Another route is to solve an optimal
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control problem of a single agent based on consistent mean
field approximations and formalize a fixed point problem to
determine the mean field, and this is called the fixed point (or
top-down) approach [28], [29] and also called Nash certainty
equivalence in [29]; see route two in Fig. 1. The solution of
the fixed point problem may be used to design decentralized
strategies in the original large but finite population model
to achieve an ε-Nash equilibrium [28]. Under such a set of
strategies, each player can further improve little even if it can
access centralized information of all players. Compared with
Nash strategies determined under centralized information, the
above solution has much lower complexity in its computation
and implementation.
The reader may consult further literature on the direct
approach [9] and the fixed point approach [4], [5], [12],
[32], [37]. Also see [17], [34] for the direct approach in a
probabilistic framework. We note that the diagram in Fig. 1
displays the basic theoretic framework of mean field games
with all players being comparably small, called peers. When
the model involves a major player or common noise, the
analysis has been extended for the direct approach [10] and
the fixed point approach [4], [8], [12], [13], [27], [41].
So far the investigation of the connection and difference be-
tween the two approaches regarding their scope of applicability
is scarce. Their systematic comparison is generally difficult
since in the literature very often the analysis in each approach
is carried out under various sufficient conditions. In this work
we contribute in this direction within the framework of linear-
quadratic (LQ) mean field games with a finite time horizon.
The analysis of mean field games in the LQ setting has
attracted substantial interest due to their appealing analytical
structure [5], [8], [25], [28], [37], [40], [42], [48], [51],
[52]. Specifically, the decentralized strategy of an individual
player may be determined in a linear feedback form. Partial
state information is considered in [8], [25], and [25] adopts
linear backward stochastic differential equations to model state
dynamics.
In this paper we first study an asymptotic solvability
problem initially introduced in [31], which may be viewed
as an instance of the direct (i.e., bottom-up) approach. We
adopt an appropriately defined asymptotic solvability notion
for the sequence of LQ games with increasing population
sizes so that a neat necessary and sufficient condition can
be derived. This will on one hand further our understanding
of the direct approach and on the other offer a foundation
for a thorough comparison with the fixed point approach.
2We start with an entirely conventional solution of the game
by dynamic programming, which leads to a set of coupled
Riccati ODEs. It turns out that the necessary and sufficient
condition for asymptotic solvability is characterized by a
low dimensional non-symmetric Riccati ODE derived by a
novel re-scaling technique. The methodology of identifying
low dimensional dynamics to capture essential information
on high dimensional dynamical behavior shares similarity
to the statistical physics literature on mean field oscillator
models [38], [43], [45]. This approach is also closely related
to an early problem of mean field social optimization, which
studies a high dimensional algebraic Riccati equation (ARE)
and uses symmetry for dimension reduction [26, Sec. 6.3].
Other related works include [24], [44], [47]. An optimal
control problem for a set of symmetric agents with mean
field coupling is solved in [24] by a large-scale Riccati ODE,
and a mean field limit is derived. An LQ Nash game of
infinite time horizon is analyzed in [44] where the number
of players increases to infinity. By postulating the strategies
of all players and examining the control problem of a fixed
player, a family of low dimensional control problems and their
parametrized AREs are solved by applying an implicit function
theorem for which sufficient conditions are obtained for large
population sizes. The solvability of LQ games with increasing
population sizes in the set-up of [36] is studied in [47]
analyzing 2N-coupled steady-state Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equations under
some algebraic conditions, where each player’s control is
restricted to be local state feedback from the beginning.
Subsequently the paper investigates the relation of the
two fundamental approaches [28], [29], [36] shown in Fig.
1, which has been made possible by the solution of the
asymptotic solvability problem. In so doing, we first revisit the
fixed point approach for the mean field game, and determine
the necessary and sufficient condition for the solvability of
the resulting two point boundary value (TPBV) problem.
It is shown that asymptotic solvability provides a sufficient
condition for the TPBV problem to be solvable and in fact
uniquely solvable in this case; this is due to the fact that one
can use a non-symmetric Riccati ODE to decouple and solve
a general linear TPBV problem [18]. However, there exist
scenarios for our TPBV problem to be solvable but asymptotic
solvability fails. This suggests non-equivalence of the two
approaches in general. We make a further connection with
the original work [28], which applies the fixed point approach
under a contraction condition; we show in this case asymptotic
solvability holds for the sequence of games.
Our study of the asymptotic solvability problem and the
subsequent comparison of the two fundamental approaches
provides new insights into the relation between the infinite
population mean field game and large finite population games.
Historically, the study of the relation between large finite
population games and their infinite population limit has been
a subject of great interest and importance [1], [11], [21], [23],
[39] although this is usually for static games.
For the TPBV problem in the fixed point approach we
further examine the non-uniqueness issue, which has been of
interest in the MFG literature; see non-uniqueness results for
            route 1
MFG equation system:
     1 equation of optimal control;
    1 equation of mean field       
         dynamics (for      ) 
 
Example: HJB eqn, FPK eqn (or 
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        costs:
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Fig. 1. The two fundamental approaches: The direct (or bottom-up) approach
(see route 1) and the fixed point (or top-down) approach (see route 2)
nonlinear MFG models [2], [14], [19] and for an LQ example
with a non-quadratic terminal cost [50]. Non-uniqueness has
been well studied in the traditional literature of LQ dynamic
games; see [15], [16]. Finally, we analyze the long time
behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati ODE in the asymptotic
solvability problem. The analysis is related to a non-symmetric
algebraic Riccati equation (NARE) and faces the issue of
solution selection. We introduce the notion of a stabilizing
solution for the NARE and derive the necessary and sufficient
condition for its existence and uniqueness.
The main contributions of the paper are outlined as follows:
1) We study an N-player LQ Nash game and introduce the
notion of asymptotic solvability, which can be regarded
as a direct approach in mean field games.
2) By a re-scaling technique, a necessary and sufficient
condition for asymptotic solvability is obtained in terms
of a non-symmetric Riccati ODE. This lays down a
foundation to address the exact relation of two fun-
damental approaches in mean field games: the direct
approach and the fixed point approach. We show asymp-
totic solvability implies unique solvability of the TPBV
problem in the fixed point approach. We further show
that a contraction condition of the fixed point approach
introduced in the original work [28] implies asymptotic
solvability. We further determine conditions for non-
uniqueness to occur in the fixed point approach.
3) The long time behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati
ODE in the direct approach is studied. A necessary and
sufficient algebraic condition is obtained for it to have
a stabilizing solution.
We make some convention on notation. Throughout the
paper, E is reserved for denoting the mean of a random
variable or a random vector. For symmetric matrix S ≥ 0, we
may write xT Sx= |x|2S. We denote by 1k×l a k× l matrix with
all entries equal to 1, by ⊗ the Kronecker product, and by
the column vectors {ek1, . . . ,ekk} the canonical basis of Rk. We
may use a subscript n to indicate the identity matrix In to be
n× n. For a vector or matrix Z, |Z| stands for its Euclidean
norm. For an l×m real matrix Z = (zi j)1≤i≤l,1≤ j≤m, denote
the l1-norm ‖Z‖l1 = ∑i, j |zi j|.
3The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II
describes the LQ Nash game together with its solution via
dynamic programming and Riccati ODEs. Section III presents
the necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvabil-
ity and derives decentralized strategies. We revisit the fixed
point approach in Section IV and examine its relation to
asymptotic solvability. To further study the relation of the
two approaches, Section V develops in-depth analysis of the
scalar individual state case. The long time behavior of the non-
symmetric Riccati ODE is examined in Section VI. Illustrative
examples are provided in Section VII. Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. THE LQ NASH GAME
Consider a population of N players (or agents) denoted by
Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. The state process Xi(t) of Ai satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXi(t) =
(
AXi(t)+Bui(t)+GX
(N)(t)
)
dt+DdWi(t), (1)
1≤ i≤ N,
where we have state Xi ∈Rn, control ui ∈Rn1 , and the coupling
term X (N) = 1
N ∑
N
k=1Xk. The constant matrices A, B, G, D have
compatible dimensions. The initial states {Xi(0),1≤ i≤N} are
independent with EXi(0) = xi(0) and finite second moment.
The N standard n2-dimensional Brownian motions {Wi,1 ≤
i ≤ N} are independent and also independent of the initial
states. The cost of player Ai in the Nash game is given by
Ji = E
∫ T
0
(
|Xi(t)−ΓX (N)(t)−η |2Q+ uTi (t)Rui(t)
)
dt
+E|Xi(T )−ΓfX (N)(T )−η f |2Q f . (2)
The constant matrices (or vectors) Γ , Q, R, Γf , Q f , η , η f
above have compatible dimensions, and we have Q≥ 0, R> 0,
Q f ≥ 0 for these symmetric matrices. For notational simplicity,
we only consider constant parameters for the model. Except
for long time behavior in Section VI, our analysis and results
can be easily extended to the case of time-dependent param-
eters.
Define
X(t) =
X1(t)...
XN(t)
 ∈ RNn, W (t) =
W1(t)...
WN(t)
 ∈RNn2 ,
Â= diag[A, · · · ,A]+ 1n×n⊗ G
N
∈ RNn×Nn,
D̂ = diag[D, · · · ,D] ∈ RNn×Nn2 ,
Bk = e
N
k ⊗B ∈ RNn×n1 , 1≤ k ≤ N.
Now we write system of SDEs in (1) in the form
dX(t) =
(
ÂX(t)+
N
∑
k=1
Bkuk(t)
)
dt+ D̂dW (t). (3)
Under closed-loop perfect state (CLPS) information, we de-
note the value function of Ai by Vi(t,x), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, which
corresponds to the initial condition X(t) = x = (xT1 , . . . ,x
T
N)
T
and a cost evaluated on [t,T ] in place of (2). The set of value
functions is determined by the system of HJB equations
0=
∂Vi
∂ t
+ min
ui∈Rn1
(
∂TVi
∂x
(
Âx+
N
∑
k=1
Bkuk
)
+ uTi Rui
+ |xi−Γ x(N)−η |2Q+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (Vi)xxD̂
))
, (4)
Vi(T,x) = |xi−Γf x(N)−η f |2Q f , 1≤ i≤ N,
where x(N) = (1/N)∑Nk=1 xk and the minimizer is
ui =−1
2
R−1BTi
∂Vi
∂x
, 1≤ i≤ N. (5)
Next we substitute (5) into (4) to obtain
0=
∂Vi
∂ t
+
∂TVi
∂x
(
Âx−
N
∑
k=1
1
2
BkR
−1BTk
∂Vk
∂x
)
+ |xi−Γ x(N)−η |2Q
+
1
4
∂TVi
∂x
BiR
−1BTi
∂Vi
∂x
+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (Vi)xxD̂
)
. (6)
Denote
Ki = [0, · · · ,0, In,0, · · · ,0]− 1
N
[Γ ,Γ , · · · ,Γ ],
Ki f = [0, · · · ,0, In,0, · · · ,0]− 1
N
[Γf ,Γf , · · · ,Γf ],
Qi =K
T
i QKi, Qi f =K
T
i fQ fKi f ,
where In is the ith submatrix. We write
|xi−Γ x(N)−η |2Q =xTQix− 2xTKTi Qη +ηTQη , (7)
and write |xi−Γf x(N)−η f |2Q f in a similar form.
Suppose Vi(t,x) has the following form
Vi(t,x) = x
TPi(t)x+ 2S
T
i (t)x+ri(t), (8)
where Pi is symmetric. Then
∂Vi
∂x
= 2Pi(t)x+ 2Si(t),
∂ 2Vi
∂x2
= 2Pi(t). (9)
We substitute (8) and (9) into (6) and derive the equation
systems:
P˙i(t) =−
(
Pi(t)Â+ Â
TPi(t)
)
+(
Pi(t)∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Pk(t)
+∑Nk=1Pk(t)BkR
−1BTk Pi(t)
)
−Pi(t)BiR−1BTi Pi(t)−Qi,
Pi(T ) =Qi f ,
(10)

S˙i(t) =−ÂTSi(t)−Pi(t)BiR−1BTi Si(t)
+Pi(t)∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk(t)
+∑Nk=1Pk(t)BkR
−1BTk Si(t)
+KTi Qη ,
Si(T ) =−KTi fQ fη f ,
(11)
4
r˙i(t) = 2Si
T (t)∑Nk=1BkR
−1BTk Sk(t)
−STi (t)BiR−1BTi Si(t)
−ηTQη −Tr(D̂TPi(t)D̂),
ri(T ) = η
T
f Q fη f .
(12)
Remark 1: If (10) has a solution (P1, · · · ,PN) on [τ,T ] ⊆
[0,T ], such a solution is unique due to the local Lipschitz
continuity of the vector field [22]. Taking transpose on both
sides of (10) gives an ODE system for P Ti , 1≤ i≤ N, which
shows that (P T1 , · · · ,P TN ) still satisfies (10). So the ODE
system (10) guarantees each Pi to be symmetric
Remark 2: If (10) has a unique solution (P1, · · · ,PN)
on [0,T ], then we can uniquely solve (S1, · · · ,SN) and
(r1, · · · ,rN) by using linear ODEs.
For the N-player Nash game, we consider CLPS informa-
tion, so that the state vector X(t) is available to each player.
Theorem 1: Suppose that (10) has a unique solution
(P1, · · · ,PN) on [0,T ]. Then we can uniquely solve (11)–(12),
and the game of N players has a set of feedback Nash strategies
given by
ui =−R−1BTi (PiX(t)+Si), 1≤ i≤ N.
Proof: This theorem follows the standard results in [3,
Theorem 6.16, Corollaries 6.5 and 6.12]. 
By Theorem 1, the solution of the feedback Nash strategies
completely reduces to the study of (10). For this reason, our
subsequent analysis starts by analyzing (10).
III. ASYMPTOTIC SOLVABILITY
Definition 2: The sequence of Nash games (1)–(2) with
closed-loop perfect state information has asymptotic solvabil-
ity if there exists N0 such that for all N ≥N0, (P1, · · · ,PN) in
(10) has a solution on [0,T ] and
sup
N≥N0
sup
1≤i≤N,0≤t≤T
‖Pi(t)‖l1 < ∞. (13)
Definition 2 only involves the Riccati equations. This is
sufficient due to Remark 2. The boundedness condition (13)
is to impose certain regularity of the solutions, which is
necessary for studying the asymptotic behavior of the system
when N→ ∞.
Let the Nn×Nn identity matrix be partitioned in the form:
INn =

In 0 · · · 0
0 In · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 In
 .
For 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N, exchanging the ith and jth rows of
submatrices in INn, let Ji j denote the resulting matrix. For
instance, we have
J12 =

0 In · · · 0
In 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 In
 .
It is easy to check that JTi j = J
−1
i j = Ji j.
Theorem 3: We assume that (10) has a solution
(P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) on [0,T ]. Then the following holds.
i) P1(t) has the representation
P1(t) =

Π1(t) Π2(t) Π2(t) · · · Π2(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π3(t) · · · Π3(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π3(t) · · · Π3(t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π3(t) · · · Π3(t)
 , (14)
where Π1 and Π3 are n× n symmetric matrices.
ii) For i> 1, Pi(t) = J
T
1iP1(t)J1i.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
By Theorem 3, (13) is equivalent to the following condition:
sup
N≥N0,0≤t≤T
(|Π1(t)|+N|Π2(t)|+N2|Π3(t)|)< ∞. (15)
We present some continuous dependence result of
parametrized ODEs in Theorem 4 below. This will play a key
role in establishing Theorem 5 later. Consider
x˙= f (t,x), x(0) = z ∈ RK , (16)
y˙= f (t,y)+ g(ε, t,y), (17)
where y(0) = zε ∈ RK , 0< ε ≤ 1.
Let φ(t,x) = f (t,x), or f (t,x)+g(ε, t,x). We introduce the
following assumptions on (16) and (17).
(A1) supε,0≤t≤T | f (t,0)|+ |g(ε, t,0)| ≤C1.
(A2) φ(·,x) is Lebesgue measurable for each fixed x ∈RK .
(A3) For each t ∈ [0,T ], φ(t,x) : RK → RK is locally
Lipschitz in x, uniformly with respect to (t,ε), i.e., for any
fixed r > 0, and x,y ∈ Br(0) which is the open ball of radius
r centering 0,
|φ(t,x)−φ(t,y)| ≤ Lip(r)|x− y|,
where Lip(r) depends only on r, not on ε ∈ (0,1], t ∈ [0,T ].
(A4) limε→0 |zε − z|= 0, and for each fixed r > 0,
lim
ε→0
sup
0≤t≤T,y∈Br(0)
|g(ε, t,y)|= 0.
If the solutions to (16) and (17), denoted by xz(t) and
yε(t), exist on [0,T ], they are unique by the local Lipschitz
condition (A3); in this case denote δε =
∫ T
0 |g(ε,τ,xz(τ))|dτ ,
which converges to 0 as ε → 0 due to (A4).
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions (A1)–(A4), we have the
following assertions:
i) If (16) has a solution xz(t) on [0,T ], then there exists
0< ε¯ ≤ 1 such that for all 0< ε ≤ ε¯ , (17) has a solution yε(t)
on [0,T ] and
sup
0≤t≤T
|yε (t)− xz(t)|= O(|zε − z|+ δε). (18)
ii) Suppose there exists a sequence {εi, i≥ 1} where 0< εi≤
1 and limi→∞ εi = 0 such that (17) with ε = εi has a solution
yεi on [0,T ] and supi≥1,0≤t≤T |yεi(t)| ≤C2 for some constant
C2. Then (16) has a solution on [0,T ].
Proof: See Appendix B. 
5Remark 3: If (16) and (17) are replaced by matrix ODEs
and (or) a terminal condition at T is used in each equation,
the results in Theorem 4 still hold.
Let
M = BR−1BT .
Before presenting further results, we introduce two Riccati
ODEs: {
Λ˙1 = Λ1MΛ1− (Λ1A+ATΛ1)−Q,
Λ1(T ) = Q f ,
(19)
and 
Λ˙2 = Λ1MΛ2+Λ2MΛ1+Λ2MΛ2
−(Λ1G+Λ2(A+G)+ATΛ2)+QΓ ,
Λ2(T ) =−Q fΓf .
(20)
Note that (19) is the standard Riccati ODE in LQ optimal
control and has a unique solution Λ1 on [0,T ]. Equation (20)
is a non-symmetric Riccati ODE, where Λ1 is now treated as
a known function. We state the main theorem on asymptotic
solvability.
Theorem 5: The sequence of games in (1)–(2) has asymp-
totic solvability if and only if (20) has a unique solution on
[0,T ].
Proof: See Appendix C. 
We outline the key idea for identifying this necessary and
sufficient condition of asymptotic solvability. By Theorem 3
and the ODE of P1(t) in (10), we obtain an ODE system of
the form Π˙1Π˙2
Π˙3
=ΨN(Π1,Π2,Π3).
However, directly taking N → ∞ is not useful because this
method on one hand will not generate a meaningful limit of
the vector field ΨN owing to terms such as (N−1)Π2MΠ2 in
ΨN (see (A.3) ) and on the other will cause a loss of dynamical
information since (Π2,Π3) can vanish when N → ∞. Our
method is to re-scale by defining
ΛN1 = Π1(t), Λ
N
2 = NΠ2(t), Λ
N
3 = N
2Π3(t), (21)
and examine their ODE system. This procedure leads to a
new limiting ODE system which can preserve key information
about the dynamics of (Π1,Π2,Π3) and which consists of (19)
and (20) together with another equation:
Λ˙3 = Λ
T
2 MΛ2+Λ3MΛ1+Λ1MΛ3+Λ3MΛ2+Λ
T
2 MΛ3
−(ΛT2 G+GTΛ2+Λ3(A+G)+ (AT +GT )Λ3)
−Γ TQΓ ,
Λ3(T ) = Γ
T
f Q fΓf .
(22)
Note that after (19) and (20) are solved on [0,T ] (or otherwise
on a maximal existence interval for the latter), (22) becomes
a linear ODE.
Theorem 6: Suppose (20) has a solution on [0,T ]. Then we
have
sup
0≤t≤T
(|Π1−Λ1|+ |NΠ2−Λ2|+ |N2Π3−Λ3|) = O(1/N).
Proof: The bound follows from Theorem 4 i) by use
of g1,g2,g3 and the terminal conditions which appear in the
equations of ΛN1 , Λ
N
2 , Λ
N
3 in Appendix C. 
A. Decentralized Control
Proposition 7: Assume that (10) has a solution (P1, · · · ,PN)
on [0,T ]. Then the assertions hold:
i) Si(t) in (11) has the form
Si(t) = [θ
T
2 (t), · · · ,θT1 (t), · · · ,θT2 (t)]T , (23)
in which the ith sub-vector is θ1(t) ∈ Rn and the remaining
sub-vectors are θ2(t) ∈ Rn.
ii) Furthermore, r1 = r2 = · · ·= rN for t ∈ [0,T ].
Proof: See Appendix C. 
We introduce two ODEs:{
χ˙1(t) = (Λ1M+Λ2M−AT )χ1+Qη ,
χ1(T ) =−Q fη f ,
(24)
and
χ˙2(t) = ((Λ
T
2 +Λ3)M−GT )χ1
+((Λ1+Λ
T
2 )M− (AT +GT ))χ2−Γ TQη ,
χ2(T ) = Γ
T
f Q f η f .
(25)
Define
χN1 (t) = θ1(t), χ
N
2 (t) = Nθ2(t). (26)
In fact (24) and (25) can be derived as the limit of the ODEs
satisfied by (χN1 ,χ
N
2 ); see Appendix C.
Proposition 8: For (θ1(t),θ2(t)) specified in (23), we have
sup
0≤t≤T
(|θ1(t)− χ1(t)|+ |Nθ2(t)− χ2(t)|) = O(1/N). (27)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
By Theorem 1, the strategy of player Ai is
ui =−R−1BT
(
Π1(t)Xi+Π2(t)∑
j 6=i
X j+θ1(t)
)
. (28)
The closed-loop equation of Xi is now given by
dXi(t) =
(
AXi−M
(
Π1Xi+Π2 ∑
j 6=i
X j+θ1
)
+GX (N)
)
dt+DdWi,
which gives
dX (N) =[(A−M(Π1+(N− 1)Π2)+G)X (N)−Mθ1]dt
+
D
N
N
∑
i=1
dWi. (29)
To denote the limit of (29) when N → ∞, we introduce the
closed-loop mean field dynamics
dX¯
dt
= (A−M(Λ1+Λ2)+G) X¯−Mχ1(t), (30)
where X¯(0) = x0.
Proposition 9: Suppose E supi≥1 |Xi(0)|2≤C for some fixed
constant C and limN→∞ 1N ∑
N
i=1EXi(0) = x0. Then
sup
0≤t≤T
E|X (N)(t)− X¯(t)|2 = O(| 1
N
N
∑
i=1
EXi(0)− x0|2+ 1/N).
6Proof: By (29)–(30), we find the explicit expression
of X (N)(t)− X¯(t). The proposition follows from elementary
estimates by use of Theorem 6 and Proposition 8. 
When N→ ∞, from (28) we obtain the control law
udi =−R−1BT (Λ1Xi+Λ2X¯+ χ1(t)) , (31)
which is decentralized since X¯ and χ1 do not depend on the
sample path information of other players and can be computed
off-line. Suppose Λ1 and Λ2 have been given on [0,T ]. Then
(31) can be determined by solving the decoupled ODE system
(24) and (30), which has a unique solution. Note that (24) has
its origin in dynamic programming.
IV. RELATION TO THE FIXED POINT APPROACH
The fixed point approach for solving the LQ mean field
game consists of two steps (see e.g. [28]).
Step 1. We use X ∈C([0,T ],Rn) to approximate X (N) in (1)
and consider the optimal control problem with dynamics and
cost:
dX∞i (t) = (AX
∞
i (t)+Bui(t)+GX(t))dt+DdWi, (32)
J¯i(ui) = E
∫ T
0
(|X∞i −ΓX−η |2Q+ uTi Rui)dt
+E|X∞i (T )−ΓfX(T )−η f |2Q f ,
where we set X∞i (0)=Xi(0). The Brownian motion is the same
as in (1). Applying dynamic programming, the optimal control
law is given by
uˆi =−R−1BT (Λ1X∞i (t)+ s(t)), (33)
where Λ1 is solved from (19) and
s˙(t) =−(AT −Λ1M)s(t)−Λ1GX(t)+Q(ΓX(t)+η),
and s(T ) =−Q f (ΓfX(T )+η f ).
Step 2. Let limN→∞ 1N ∑
N
i=1EX
∞
i (t) be determined from the
closed-loop system of (32) under the control law uˆi and the
given X . By the standard consistency requirement in mean field
games [28], we impose X(t) = limN→∞ 1N ∑
N
i=1EX
∞
i (t) for all
t ∈ [0,T ], which amounts to specifying X as a fixed point. This
introduces the equation
dX
dt
= (A−MΛ1+G)X−Ms,
where X(0) = x0 and we assume limN→∞ 1N ∑
N
i=1EXi(0) = x0
as in Section III.
Combining the ODEs of s and X gives the MFG solution
equation system{
dX
dt
= (A−MΛ1+G)X−Ms,
s˙=−(AT −Λ1M)s−Λ1GX+Q(ΓX+η),
(34)
where X(0)= x0 and s(T ) =−Q f (ΓfX(T )+η f ). The equation
system (34) is a TPBV problem.
Remark 4: We introduce in (34) the new notation X instead
of X¯ . It is necessary to maintain this distinction since the
two functions coincide only under certain conditions as shown
later.
A. Solving the TPBV Problem
Denote
A(t) =
[
A−MΛ1(t)+G −M
QΓ −Λ1(t)G −AT +Λ1(t)M
]
. (35)
The fundamental solution matrix of (34) is determined by the
matrix ODE
∂
∂ t
Φ(t,τ) = AΦ(t,τ), Φ(τ,τ) = I2n. (36)
Denote
Φ(t,τ) =
[
Φ11(t,τ) Φ12(t,τ)
Φ21(t,τ) Φ22(t,τ)
]
, (37)
where each submatrix is n× n.
Denote
Z1 = Φ22(T,0)+Q fΓfΦ12(T,0) ∈ Rn×n,
Z2 = [Φ21(T,0)+Q fΓfΦ11(T,0)]x0+Q fη f
+
∫ T
0
[Φ22(T,τ)+Q fΓfΦ12(T,τ)]Qηdτ ∈ Rn.
Proposition 10: i) (34) has a solution if and only if
Z2 ∈ span{Z1}. (38)
ii) If det
(
Z1
) 6= 0, (34) has a unique solution.
Proof: i) We introduce s(0) to be determined. By (34),[
X(T )
s(T )
]
=Φ(T,0)
[
x0
s(0)
]
+
∫ T
0
Φ(T,τ)
[
0
Qη
]
dτ
=
[
Φ11(T,0) Φ12(T,0)
Φ21(T,0) Φ22(T,0)
][
x0
s(0)
]
+
∫ T
0
[
Φ11(T,τ) Φ12(T,τ)
Φ21(T,τ) Φ22(T,τ)
][
0
Qη
]
dτ.
Then (34) has a solution if and only if there exists s(0) such
that
s(T ) = Φ21(T,0)x0+Φ22(T,0)s(0)+
∫ T
0
Φ22(T,τ)Qηdτ,
=−Q f (ΓfX(T )+η f ), (39)
which is equivalent to Z1s(0)+Z2 = 0. This proves part i).
ii) This part follows from part i). 
For illustration, we consider the special case with Γf = 0,
η f = 0. Then (38) in Proposition 10 i) becomes
Φ21(T,0)x0+
∫ T
0
Φ22(T,τ)Qηdτ ∈ span
{
Φ22(T,0)
}
.
B. Direct Approach Solvability Implies Fixed Point Solvability
Theorem 11: Suppose Λ2 has a solution on [0,T ]. Then the
following holds.
i) (34) has a unique solution (X ,s) given by{
X(t) = X¯(t),
s(t) = Λ2(t)X¯(t)+ χ1(t),
where (X¯ ,χ1) is solved from (24) and (30) in the direct
approach.
ii) Asymptotic solvability of the sequence of games (1)–(2)
implies that (34) has a unique solution.
7Proof: i) For (34), we write
s= Λ2X+ϕ(t), (40)
where ϕ is a new unknown function. Now (34) is transformed
into a new equation system in terms of (X ,ϕ), where
ϕ˙ = (Λ1M+Λ2M−AT )ϕ +Qη , ϕ(T ) =−Q fη f .
The terminal condition ϕ(T ) has been determined from (40)
with t = T . We can uniquely solve ϕ and in fact ϕ = χ1.
Subsequently, we further obtain X = X¯ . It is clear the solution
(X ,s) is unique.
ii) This part follows from Theorem 5 and part i). 
Let (33) be applied by the N players in (1), and accordingly
denote
uˆdi =−R−1BT (Λ1Xi(t)+ s(t)). (41)
Under the asymptotic solvability condition, the two control
laws uˆdi in (41) and u
d
i in (31) are equivalent by Theorem
11. Based on assumptions on the initial states as given in
Proposition 9, one can apply the standard method in [28] to
show that the set of strategies (uˆd1 , · · · , uˆdN) in (41) is an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the N-player game, where ε → 0 as N→ ∞.
The existence and uniqueness condition in the TPBV
problem is quite different from the condition for asymptotic
solvability. It is possible that the Riccati equation of Λ2 has
a finite escape time in [0,T ) but the TPBV problem is still
solvable. A detailed comparison will be developed in the next
section for scalar models.
C. Fixed Point via A Contraction Mapping
The original analysis in [28] applies the fixed point approach
to infinite time horizon LQ mean field games and establishes
existence and uniqueness of a solution by specifying a con-
traction mapping. The procedure in [28] can be applied to
(34) to derive a corresponding contraction condition as well.
By Theorem 11, asymptotic solvability in the direct approach
implies the fixed point solvability, but the converse may not
hold (and is indeed not true as it turns out later). Now if the
fixed point is determined from a contraction mapping as in
[28], an intriguing question is what is its implication regarding
asymptotic solvability. Below we show asymptotic solvability
holds in this case.
To facilitate further analysis, we consider (34) on a general
interval [t0,T ] for t0 ∈ [0,T ), and rewrite it as below:{
dX
dt
= (A−MΛ1+G)X−Ms,
s˙=−(AT −Λ1M)s−Λ1GX+Q(ΓX+η).
(42)
The initial and terminal conditions are given by X(t0) = xt0
and s(T ) =−Q f (ΓfX(T )+η f ).
Denote the linear ODEs
y˙1 = (A−MΛ1(t)+G)y1, y˙2 = (−AT +Λ1(t)M)y2,
where t ∈ [0,T ] and yi(t) ∈ Rn. Let Ψ1 and Ψ2 be their
fundamental solution matrices so that
∂Ψ1(t,τ)
∂ t
= (A−MΛ1(t)+G)Ψ1(t,τ), Ψ1(τ,τ) = I,
∂Ψ2(t,τ)
∂ t
= (−AT +Λ1(t)M)Ψ2(t,τ), Ψ2(τ,τ) = I.
Following the procedure in [28], we solve s from the second
equation of (42) to obtain
s(t) =−Ψ2(t,T )Q fΓfX(T )
−
∫ T
t
Ψ2(t,r)(QΓ −Λ1(r)G)X(r)dr+ ζ1(t), (43)
where ζ1 depends on (η ,η f ) but not on X . Substituting (43)
into the first equation of (42), we have the expression
X(t) =Ψ1(t, t0)xt0 +
∫ t
t0
Ψ1(t,τ)MΨ2(τ,T )Q fΓfX(T )dτ
+
∫ t
t0
∫ T
τ
Ψ1(t,τ)MΨ2(τ,r)(QΓ −Λ1(r)G)X(r)drdτ
+ ζ2(t), (44)
where ζ2 depends on (η ,η f ) but not on (X ,xt0). Denote the
operator ϒt0 : C([t0,T ],R
n)→C([t0,T ],Rn) as follows:
(ϒt0φ)(t) =
∫ t
t0
Ψ1(t,τ)MΨ2(τ,T )Q fΓfφ(T )dτ
+
∫ t
t0
∫ T
τ
Ψ1(t,τ)MΨ2(τ,r)(QΓ −Λ1(r)G)φ(r)drdτ.
We take the norm ‖φ‖= supt∈[t0,T ] |φ(t)| inC([t0,T ],Rn). Now
(44) can be written as
X(t) =Ψ1(t, t0)xt0 +(ϒt0X)(t)+ ζ2(t), t ∈ [t0,T ].
Denote the constant
κt0 = sup
t0≤t≤T
[∫ t
t0
∫ T
τ
|Ψ1(t,τ)MΨ2(τ,r)[QΓ −Λ1(r)G]|drdτ
+
∫ t
t0
|Ψ1(t,τ)MΨ2(τ,T )Q fΓf |dτ
]
.
We have the estimate
‖ϒt0φ1−ϒt0φ2‖ ≤ κt0‖φ1−φ2‖, ∀ φ1,φ2 ∈C([t0,T ],Rn).
It is straightforward to check that κt0 ≤ κ0 for all t0 ∈ [0,T ].
Theorem 12: Suppose κ0 < 1. Then asymptotic solvability
holds for the sequence of games (1)–(2).
Proof: We prove by contradiction. Suppose asymptotic
solvability doe not hold for (1)–(2), which implies Λ2 has
a maximal existence interval (t∗,T ] for t∗ ∈ [0,T ). So there
exists a strictly decreasing sequence {tk,k≥ 1} converging to
t∗ such that limk→∞ |Λ2(tk)| = ∞. We can find an appropriate
subsequence, still denoted by {tk,k ≥ 1}, such that for some
(iˆ, jˆ), we have
lim
k→∞
|Λ iˆ, jˆ2 (tk)|= ∞, |Λ iˆ, jˆ2 (tk)|= max
1≤i, j≤n
|Λ i, j2 (tk)|, (45)
where the superscripts indicate the (i, j)-th entry of Λ2(tk).
Now for tk in (45), we select xtk = [0, . . . ,0,1,0, . . . ,0]
T = en
jˆ
,
and solve a special form of (42) on [tk,T ] as follows:{
dX
∗
dt
= (A−MΛ1+G)X∗−Ms∗,
s˙∗ =−(AT −Λ1M)s∗+(QΓ −Λ1G)X∗,
(46)
which has initial condition X
∗
(tk) = xtk = e
n
jˆ
and terminal
condition s∗(T ) =−Q fΓfX∗(T ). By the relation
X
∗
(t) =Ψ1(t, tk)xtk +(ϒtkX
∗
)(t), t ∈ [tk,T ]
8and κtk ≤ κ0, we obtain a unique solution (X
∗
,s∗) ∈
C([tk,T ],R
2n) for (46) and have the bound
‖X∗‖ ≤ 1
1−κ0 supt,τ∈[0,T ]
|Ψ1(t,τ)|.
In parallel to (43),
s∗(t) =−Ψ2(t,T )Q fΓfX∗(T )
−
∫ T
t
Ψ2(t,r)(QΓ −Λ1(r)G)X ∗(r)dr.
We may further find a fixed constantC0 independent of tk such
that
sup
t∈[tk ,T ]
[|X∗(t)|+ |s∗(t)|]≤C0. (47)
On the other hand, for each tk appearing in (45) and the result-
ing interval [tk,T ], by the fact that Λ2 exists on (t
∗,T ]⊃ [tk,T ],
we may use the method in Theorem 11 to show the relation
s∗(t) = Λ2(t)X
∗
(t), t ∈ [tk,T ].
Hence s∗(tk) = Λ2(tk)enjˆ , and by (45),
lim
k→∞
|s∗(tk)|= ∞,
which contradicts (47).
We conclude that Λ2 has a solution on [0,T ]. Therefore,
asymptotic solvability holds for (1)–(2). 
Remark 5: We use κ0 < 1 to ensure a contraction condition
for the TPBV problem defined on [0,T ]. It is possible to have
improved contraction estimates. Our method here is adequate
for addressing the qualitative relation as shown in Theorem 12.
V. THE SCALAR CASE: EXPLICIT SOLUTIONS
A. Riccati Equations of Asymptotic Solvability
We analyze a scalar case of the Riccati ODEs (19) and (20),
i.e., n= 1, and suppose B 6= 0 for the model to be nontrivial.
Consider{
Λ˙1 = Λ
2
1 − 2AΛ1−Q, (48)
Λ˙2 = 2Λ1Λ2+Λ
2
2 −Λ2(2A+G)−Λ1G+QΓ , (49)
where Λ1(T ) = Q f and Λ2(T ) = −Q fΓf . Without loss of
generality we only deal with the case M = 1 since otherwise
a change of variable may be used to convert (19)–(20) to
the above form with appropriately modified parameters Q and
Q f . Although Λ1(t) can be explicitly solved for a general Q f ,
one usually cannot further solve Λ2(t) in a closed form. To
overcome this difficulty, we will further take particular choices
of the terminal conditions to obtain explicit solutions. Our
method is to choose Q f appropriately to solve Λ1(t) as a
constant so that (49) becomes a Riccati equation with constant
coefficients.
In this section we further suppose the pair (A,
√
Q) is
detectable. Denote the algebraic Riccati equation
Λ21∞− 2AΛ1∞−Q= 0,
which gives the stabilizing solution
Λ1∞ = A+
√
A2+Q≥ 0, (50)
such that A−MΛ1∞ = A−Λ1∞ < 0. Below we take
M = 1, Q f = Λ1∞, Γf = 0. (51)
Then (48) has a constant solution Λ1(t) ≡ Λ1∞, and (49)
becomes
Λ˙2 = 2aˆΛ2+Λ
2
2 + Qˆ, Λ2(T ) = 0, (52)
where
aˆ=
√
A2+Q− G
2
, Qˆ= QΓ − (A+√A2+Q)G. (53)
To solve (52), let Λ2 =− u′u . Then (52) leads to
u′′− 2aˆu′+ Qˆu= 0. (54)
Denote
∆ˆ = aˆ2− Qˆ= 1
4
(2A+G)2+Q(1−Γ ).
Proposition 13: The Riccati ODE (52) has a unique solution
on [0,T ] for all T > 0 under either of the two conditions: i)
Qˆ≤ 0; ii) 0< Qˆ≤ aˆ2 and aˆ> 0.
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Proposition 14: i) If 0< Qˆ≤ aˆ2 and aˆ< 0, the solution of
(52) is given by
Λ2(t) =

Qˆ(eα(T−t)−e−α(T−t))
λˆ2e
−α(T−t)−λˆ1eα(T−t)
, if Qˆ< aˆ2,
aˆ2(T−t)
aˆ(t−T )−1 , if Qˆ= aˆ
2,
where α =
√
∆ˆ and λˆ1 = aˆ+α , λˆ2 = aˆ−α are solutions to
the characteristic equation of (54).
ii) If Qˆ> aˆ2, then
Λ2(t) =
√
Qˆsinβ (t−T )
sin
(
β (T − t)+θ) , (55)
where β =
√
Qˆ− aˆ2 > 0 and aˆ+β i=
√
Qˆeiθ for θ ∈ (0,pi).
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Remark 6: The assumptions in the four cases in Propositions
13 and 14 are categorized according to the distribution of the
two eigenvalues of the characteristic equation of (54).
Remark 7: Depending on the value of T , the solutions in
both i) and ii) of Proposition 14 may have a maximal existence
internal as a proper subset of [0,T ].
Remark 8: If
0< Qˆ< aˆ2, aˆ< 0, (56)
by Proposition 14, Λ2 has a finite escape time tˆ ∈ [0,T )
satisfying T − tˆ = Tˇ := ln(λˆ2/λˆ1)
2α if Tˇ ∈ (0,T ].
Example 1: Consider the system with
A=−1
4
, G=
4
5
, Q=
1
16
, Γ =
4
3
.
It can be verified that the system satisfies (56).
The parameters in Example 1 are constructed by first fixing
A and Q, and next searching for (G,Γ ) subject to the two
constraints in (56).
9B. The TPBV Problem and Non-uniqueness
For the scalar case n= 1, we take M = 1 and Q f =Λ1∞ so
that Λ1 = Λ1∞. Then (35) reduces to the form
A∞ =
[
G−
√
A2+Q −1
QΓ − (A+
√
A2+Q)G
√
A2+Q
]
∈R2×2, (57)
which has the characteristic polynomial
|λ I−A∞|= λ 2−Gλ +QΓ − (A2+Q+AG).
Note that for the TPBV problem (34) in the fixed point ap-
proach to have multiple solutions, a necessary condition is that
asymptotic solvability fails by Theorem 11. For constructing
non-uniqueness results, below we largely impose conditions
in Proposition 14 i). If
∆ˆ > 0, (58)
|λ I−A∞|= 0 has the real-valued solutions
λ1 =
G
2
+
√
∆ˆ , λ2 =
G
2
−
√
∆ˆ . (59)
Restricting our attention to two distinct real roots will stream-
line the presentation in constructing non-uniqueness examples.
Under (58), denote
c1 =−aˆ−
√
∆ˆ , c2 =−aˆ+
√
∆ˆ .
A∞ has two eigenvectors
vk = [1,ck]
T , k = 1,2.
corresponding to the eigenvalues λ1 and λ2, respectively. Now
for (36), we have
Φ(t,τ) = [v1,v2]
[
eλ1(t−τ)
eλ2(t−τ)
]
[v1,v2]
−1
as a 2× 2 matrix function. We further calculate
Φ21(t,τ) =
c1c2(e
λ1(t−τ)− eλ2(t−τ))
2
√
∆ˆ
, (60)
Φ22(t,τ) =
c2e
λ2(t−τ)− c1eλ1(t−τ)
2
√
∆ˆ
.
Given the parameters in (51), (34) becomes{
dX
dt
= (A−Λ1∞+G)X− s,
s˙=−(AT −Λ1∞)s−Λ1∞GX+Q(ΓX +η),
(61)
where X(0) = x0 and s(T ) =−Λ1∞η f .
In order to construct models with non-uniqueness results,
here we treat T and x0 in (61) as adjustable parameters.
Proposition 15: Assume Q f = Λ1∞. If (56) holds, then
Φ21(T,0) 6= 0 for all T > 0 and there exists a unique Tˆ > 0
such that Φ22(Tˆ ,0) = 0.
Proof: It can be shown that (56) holds if and only if
∆ˆ > 0, c1 > 0, (62)
which implies that
0< λ2 < λ1, 0< c1 < c2,
where λ1 and λ2 are given by (59). It is clear that Φ21(T,0) 6=
0. Note that Φ22(T,0) = 0 if and only if c2e
λ2T = c1e
λ1T ,
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the two approaches
for which we uniquely solve T = Tˆ := ln(c2/c1)
2
√
∆ˆ
= Tˇ > 0; see
Remark 8 for Tˇ . 
For constructing the TPBV problem below, we suppose the
assumptions of Proposition 15 hold, and uniquely solve xˆ0
from
Φ21(Tˆ ,0)xˆ0+
∫ Tˆ
0
Φ22(Tˆ ,τ)Qηdτ =−Λ1∞η f (63)
since Φ21(Tˆ ,0) 6= 0. We calculate∫ Tˆ
0
Φ22(Tˆ ,τ)dτ =
c2λ1(e
λ2Tˆ − 1)− c1λ2(eλ1Tˆ − 1)
2
√
∆ˆλ1λ2
.
Now for the scalar case with M = 1, Q f =Λ1∞, Γf = 0 and
T = Tˆ , (61) specializes to the TPBV problem{
dX
dt
= (A−Λ1∞+G)X− s,
s˙(t) =−(AT −Λ1∞)s−Λ1∞GX+Q(ΓX+η),
(64)
where X(0) = xˆ0 and s(Tˆ ) =−Λ1∞η f .
Proposition 16: Assume (51) and (56) hold. Then a solution
(X ,s) of (64) can be obtained by taking any initial condition
s(0). Therefore, (64) has an infinite number of solutions.
Proof: Recalling (39), (64) is solvable if and only if one
can find s(0) to satisfy
Φ21(Tˆ ,0)xˆ0+Φ22(Tˆ ,0)s(0)+
∫ Tˆ
0
Φ22(Tˆ ,τ)Qηdτ
=−Λ1∞η f . (65)
By (63) and Φ22(Tˆ ,0)= 0, (65) holds for any choice of s(0).
C. Comparison of Two Approaches
Consider the system given by Example 1 with time horizon
[0,T ]. It satisfies (56). Then Tˇ = Tˆ .
If we take T ∈ (0, Tˆ ), then asymptotic solvability holds and
the TPBV problem (61) has a unique solution by Theorem 11.
If T = Tˆ , then Λ2 has a finite escape time at t = 0 implying
no asymptotic solvability. However, in this case the TPBV
problem (64) has an infinite number of solutions, which in
turn can be used to construct an infinite number of ε-Nash
equilibria for the N-player game.
If T > Tˆ , asymptotic solvability fails but (61) has a unique
solution since Φ22(T,0) 6= 0 by Proposition 15.
Based on Theorems 11 and 12, and the comparison above,
the relation between the two approaches is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The rectangle region represents models satisfying the
contraction condition κ0 < 1 in Theorem 12.
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VI. LONG TIME BEHAVIOR
For this section, we make the following assumption:
(H1) The pair (A,B) is stabilizable, and the pair (A,Q
1
2 ) is
detectable.
Within the setup of continuous time dynamical systems,
a matrix Z ∈ Rk×k is called stable or Hurwitz if all its
eigenvalues have a strictly negative real part.
A. Steady State Form of Riccati ODEs
For (19), we introduce the ARE
Λ1∞MΛ1∞− (Λ1∞A+ATΛ1∞)−Q= 0.
Note that under (H1) there exists a unique solution Λ1∞ ≥ 0
from the class of positive semi-definite matrices. Correspond-
ing to (20), we introduce the algebraic equation
0= Λ1∞MΛ2∞ +Λ2∞MΛ1∞ +Λ2∞MΛ2∞
− (Λ1∞G+Λ2∞(A+G)+ATΛ2∞)+QΓ , (66)
which is a non-symmetric algebraic Riccati equation (NARE).
When (66) has a solution in Rn×n, it is possible that multiple
such solutions exist. The question is how to determine a
solution of interest, and this amounts to imposing appropriate
constraints on the solution. For related methods on choosing
a desirable solution of NAREs by fulfilling some stability
conditions, see [33].
B. Stabilizing Solution
Suppose Λ2∞ ∈ Rn×n is a solution to (66). Denote
AG = A−M(Λ1∞+Λ2∞)+G, (67)
AM = A−M(Λ1∞+ΛT2∞). (68)
To motivate the restrictions to be imposed on Λ2∞, we examine
the two ODEs (24) and (30), where the latter is the closed-loop
mean field dynamics. We start by checking the stability of the
solution of (24) when t is simply allowed to tend to −∞. If
Λ2(t) can converge to a limit Λ2∞ at all, it is well justified to
study the stability of the limiting ODE
χ˙1 = [(Λ1∞ +Λ2∞)M−AT ]χ1+Qη
=−ATMχ1+Qη , t ∈ (−∞,T ], (69)
which is constructed by replacing (Λ1(t),Λ2(t)) by (Λ1∞,Λ2∞)
in (24). The solution of (69) converges to a constant vector
χ1∞ as t→−∞ if AM is Hurwitz. Thus the generation of stable
long time behavior suggests we impose a stability condition
on AM. For (30) we similarly introduce a limiting ODE of the
form
dX¯
dt
= (A−M(Λ1∞+Λ2∞)+G) X¯−Mχ1∞
= AGX¯−Mχ1∞, t ∈ [0,∞), (70)
and further introduce a stability condition on AG in order to
have a stable solution.
Definition 17: Λ2∞ ∈Rn×n is called a stabilizing solution of
(66) if it satisfies (66) and both AG and AM are Hurwitz.
If Λ2∞ is a stabilizing solution, it has the interpretation as a
locally stable equilibrium point of the Riccati ODE (20). We
take a limiting form of (20) by replacing Λ1 by Λ1∞ and for
convenience of analysis next reverse time to obtain the new
equation
Y˙ (t) =−Λ1∞MY −YMΛ1∞−YMY
+(Λ1∞G+Y(A+G)+A
TY )−QΓ , t ≥ 0, (71)
for which we take a general initial condition Y (0). The
linearized ODE for (71) around Λ2∞ is
Z˙(t) = ATMZ+ZAG, t ≥ 0,
which is a Sylvester ODE with solution Z(t) = eA
T
MtZ(0)eAGt .
This ODE is asymptotically stable given any Z(0) if the
matrices AG and AM are Hurwitz.
We proceed to determine conditions for existence of a
stabilizing solution. Denote
A∞ =
[
A−MΛ1∞+G −M
QΓ −Λ1∞G −AT +Λ1∞M
]
∈R2n×2n, (72)
which may be viewed as a steady state form of A(t) in (35).
Let Ao ∈ Rk×k be any matrix. An l-dimensional subspace
V of Rk is called an invariant subspace of Ao if AoV ⊂ V ; in
this case AoV =VAo for some Ao ∈Rl×l where V ∈Rk×l and
span{V}= V . If Ao is Hurwitz, V is called a stable invariant
subspace. Below we give some standard definitions related
to structural properties of an invariant subspace (see e.g. [6],
[35]). For 1 ≤ l < k, an l-dimensional invariant subspace Vg
of Ao ∈ Rk×k is called a graph subspace if Vg is spanned by
the columns of a k× l matrix whose leading l× l submatrix
(i.e., its first l rows) is invertible. The k eigenvalues of Ao
have a strong (k1,k2) c-splitting if the open left half plane
and the open right half plane contain k1 and k2 eigenvalues,
respectively, for k1 ≥ 1, k2 ≥ 1, k1+ k2 = k.
We introduce the following condition on A∞:
(Hg) The eigenvalues of A∞ are strong (n,n) c-splitting
and the associated n-dimensional stable invariant subspace is
a graph subspace.
Theorem 18: i) The NARE (66) has a stabilizing solution
Λ2∞ if and only if (Hg) holds.
ii) If (Hg) holds, (66) has a unique stabilizing solution.
Proof: i) Step 1. To show necessity, suppose that Λ2∞ is
a stabilizing solution. Denote
K =
[
In 0
Λ2∞ In
]
.
Since (66) holds, it can be checked that
K−1A∞K =
[
AG −M
0 −ATM
]
. (73)
By the definition of a stabilizing solution, AG and AM are
Hurwitz. So −ATM has all its eigenvalues in the open right half
plane. Therefore, the eigenvalues of A∞ have a strong (n,n)
c-splitting. Now the columns of[
In
Λ2∞
]
span the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace of A∞ as a
graph subspace.
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Step 2. We continue to show sufficiency. Suppose the
columns of the matrix [
U1
U2
]
∈R2n×n (74)
spans the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace of A∞,
where U1 is invertible. We take
Λ2∞ =U2U
−1
1 . (75)
Then one can directly verify that Λ2∞ solves (66) (see e.g. [6,
Corollary 2.2, pp. 34]), and (73) holds where AM and AG in
(67)–(68) are determined by use of (75). Since AG is associated
with the stable invariant subspace, it is necessarily a Hurwitz
matrix. Since the eigenvalues of A∞ are (n,n) c-splitting, −ATM
has n eigenvalues in the open right half plane, which implies
that AM is Hurwitz. Hence, (66) has a stabilizing solution.
ii) Suppose Λ2∞ and Λ¯2∞ are two stabilizing solutions.
Denote
Y =
[
In
Λ2∞
]
, Y¯ =
[
In
Λ¯2∞
]
.
By Step 1, span{Y} = span{Y¯} since they both are equal to
the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace of A∞. Now for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the ith column Yi of Y is in span{Y¯}, which
further implies that Yi is equal to the ith column of Y¯ . Therefore
Λ2∞ = Λ¯2∞, and uniqueness follows. 
Theorem 18 presents a qualitative criterion on the existence
of a stabilizing solution to the NARE (66). Step 2 in the proof
further provides a computational procedure. When (Hg) holds,
one may choose any n basis vectors of the n-dimensional stable
invariant subspace to form the matrix in (74) and the resulting
matrix U1 ∈ Rn×n is necessarily invertible. Subsequently one
uses (75) to find the stabilizing solution. In fact, there is a
simple means to test whether (Hg) holds. If the eigenvalues of
A∞ are strong (n,n) c-splitting, one takes any n basis vectors
of the stable invariant subspace to form a matrix as in (74)
with U1 to be further checked. Finally, if U1 is invertible, (Hg)
holds; and (Hg) fails otherwise.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Asymptotic Solvability
Consider the Riccati ODEs (19) and (20) with n= 1.
Example 2: Take the parameters A= 0.2, B=G=Q= R=
1, Q f = Λ1∞, Γ = 1.2, Γf = 0. Then (19) gives Λ1(t) ≡ Λ1∞
and (20) becomes
Λ˙2 = 2Λ1∞Λ2+Λ
2
2 − (Λ1∞+ 1.4Λ2)+ 1.2, Λ2(T ) = 0.
By verifying condition i) in Proposition 13, we see that Λ2 has
a solution on [0,T ] for any T > 0. So asymptotic solvability
holds.
Example 3: Take Q f = 0 and T = 3. All other parameters
are the same as in Example 2. Now (19) and (20) reduce to
Λ˙1 = Λ
2
1 − 0.4Λ1− 1, Λ1(T ) = 0,
Λ˙2 = 2Λ1Λ2+Λ
2
2 − (Λ1+ 1.4Λ2)+ 1.2, Λ2(T ) = 0.
Λ1 can be solved explicitly on [0,T ]. Fig. 3 shows that Λ2
does not have a solution on the whole interval [0,T ] implying
no asymptotic solvability.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
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Fig. 3. Λ2 has a maximal existence interval small than [0,T ]
Examples 2 and 3 reveal a significant role of Λ1 in affecting
the existence interval of Λ2.
Example 4: Consider a system with parameters in Example
1 and T = 35. Following the notation in Proposition 14, then
aˆ=−0.046447, Qˆ= 4.906209× 10−4.
So
0< Qˆ< aˆ2 = 0.002157,
and 1
2α ln(λˆ2/λˆ1) = 33.587095. By Proposition 14, Λ2(t) has
a finite escape time at tˆ ≈ 1.4129. The TPBV problem (61)
has a unique solution since Φ22(35,0) 6= 0.
B. Non-uniqueness
Consider a system with parameters in Example 1 and η =
η f = 1. Following the notation in subsection V-B,
∆ˆ = 0.001667, c1 = 0.005622, c2 = 0.087271,
which satisfy the conditions in Proposition 15, and further
determine
Tˆ = 33.587095, xˆ0 =−0.394732.
Fig. 4 displays Φ21(T,0) and Φ22(T,0), where T is treated as
a variable. It shows that Φ22(T,0) = 0 when T = Tˆ .
Now consider the model (1)–(2) with time horizon [0, Tˆ ].
In this case, we have no asymptotic solvability since Λ2 has
the maximal existence interval (0, Tˆ ]. However, the TPBV
problem (64) has an infinite number of solutions.
C. Stabilizing Solution for the NARE (66)
Example 5: We take
A=
[
1 1
−0.5 1
]
, B=
[
0
1
]
, Γ =
[
0.9 0.1
0 0.9
]
, η =
[
1
0
]
,
and G= Q= I2, R= 1. Then (66) has a stabilizing solution
Λ2∞ =
[
16.238985 4.099679
4.132523 1.570208
]
.
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Fig. 4. Φ21(T,0) and Φ22(T,0) as a function of T .
In fact, the columns of the matrix
−0.167388 −0.161703
0.448957 0.742511
−0.877636 0.418170
0.013220 0.497657

span the stable invariant subspace of A∞ as a graph subspace.
A∞ has the eigenvalues
−1.022350± 0.730733i, 2.022350± 0.707903i.
Example 6: We take G = −1.2I2 and all other parameters
are the same as in Example 5. Then there exists no stabilizing
solution Λ2∞ since in this case A∞ has the eigenvalues
−1.090328± 0.762501i, −0.109672± 0.692413i.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates an asymptotic solvability problem
in LQ mean field games, and studies its connection with the
fixed point approach which involves a TPBV problem. For
asymptotic solvability we derive a necessary and sufficient
condition via a non-symmetric Riccati ODE. It is shown
that asymptotic solvability provides a sufficient condition for
the TPBV problem in the fixed point approach to have a
unique solution. We identify situations for the TPBV problem
to be solvable or have multiple solutions when asymptotic
solvability does not hold. The long time behavior of the non-
symmetric Riccati ODE in the asymptotic solvability problem
is addressed by studying the stabilizing solution to a non-
symmetric algebraic Riccati equation.
The re-scaling technique used in studying asymptotic solv-
ability can be extended to more general models in terms of
dynamics, interaction and information patterns [8], [25], [27],
[30]. This will be reported in our future work.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Lemma A.1: We assume that (10) has a solution
(P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) on [0,T ]. Then the following holds.
i) P1(t) has the representation
P1(t) =

Π1(t) Π2(t) Π2(t) · · · Π2(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π4(t) · · · Π4(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π4(t) Π3(t) · · · Π4(t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΠT2 (t) Π4(t) Π4(t) · · · Π3(t)
 , (A.1)
where Π1, Π3 and Π4 are n× n symmetric matrices.
ii) For i> 1, Pi(t) = J
T
1iP1(t)J1i.
Proof: Step 1. It is straightforward to show
JT23ΨJ23 =Ψ ,
where Ψ is any matrix from Â, Qi, Qi f and BiR
−1BTi , i 6=
2,3. And moreover,
JT23Q2J23 =Q3, J
T
23Q3J23 =Q2
JT23Q2 f J23 =Q3 f J
T
23Q3 f J23 =Q2 f
JT23B2R
−1BT2 J23 =B3R
−1BT3 ,
JT23B3R
−1BT3 J23 =B2R
−1BT2 .
Denote JT23PiJ23 =P
†
i for 1≤ i≤N. Multiplying both sides
of (10) from the left by JT23 and next from the right by J23,
we obtain
P˙
†
i =−P †i JT23ÂJ23− JT23ÂT J23P †i
+P †i
N
∑
k=1
JT23BkR
−1BTk J23P
†
k
+
N
∑
k=1
P
†
k J
T
23BkR
−1BTk J23P
†
i
−P †i JT23BiR−1BTi J23P †i − JT23QiJ23.
Hence for i 6= 2,3,
P˙
†
i =−P †i Â− ÂTP †i +P †i
N
∑
k/∈{2,3}
BkR
−1BTk P
†
k
+P †i (B3R
−1BT3 P
†
2 +B2R
−1BT2 P
†
3 )
+
N
∑
k/∈{2,3}
P
†
k BkR
−1BTk P
†
i
+(P †2B3R
−1BT3 +P
†
3B2R
−1BT2 )P
†
i
−P †i BiR−1BTi P †i −Qi,
where P
†
i (T ) =Qi f . Similarly, we can write the equations for
P˙
†
2 and P˙
†
3 for which we omit the details. Note that P
†
2 (T ) =
Q3 f and P
†
3 (T ) =Q2 f . Subsequently, we list the N equations
by the order of P˙ †1 , P˙
†
3 , P˙
†
2 , P˙
†
4 , · · · , P˙ †N , and it turns out
that
(JT23P1J23, J
T
23P3J23, J
T
23P2J23, J
T
23P4J23, · · · ,JT23PNJ23)
satisfies (10) as (P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) does.
Step 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N, denote Pi = (P jki )1≤ j,k≤N , where
each P
jk
i is an n×n matrix. By Step 1, P1 = JT23P1J23, which
implies
P 121 = P
13
1 , P
22
1 = P
33
1 , P
23
1 = P
32
1 . (A.2)
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Repeating the above procedure by using J2k, k ≥ 4, in place
of J23, we obtain
P 121 = P
13
1 = · · ·= P 1N1 , P 221 = P 331 = · · ·= P NN1 .
We similarly obtain P1 = J
T
34P1J34, and this gives
P 231 = P
24
1 .
Repeating a similar argument, we can check all other remain-
ing off-diagonal submatrices. Since P1 is symmetric (also
see Remark 1), (P 231 )
T = P 321 , which implies that P
23
1 is
symmetric by (A.2). By the above method we can show that
the off-diagonal submatrices P
i j
1 , where i 6= j and 2 ≤ i ≤ N,
2≤ j ≤ N, are equal and symmetric. Therefore we obtain the
representation of P1.
Step 3. We can verify that
(JT12P2J12, J
T
12P1J12, J
T
12P3J12, · · · ,JT12PNJ12)
satisfies (10) as (P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) does. Hence P2 =
JT12P1J12. All other cases can be similarly checked. 
Proof of Theorem 3:
By Lemma A.1, we have
Π˙1(t) = Π1MΠ1+(N− 1)(Π2MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠT2 )
−
(
Π1(A+
G
N
)+ (AT +
GT
N
)Π1
)
− (1− 1
N
)(Π2G+G
TΠT2 )
− (I− Γ
T
N
)Q(I− Γ
N
), (A.3)
Π1(T ) = (I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f (I−
Γf
N
),
and
Π˙2(t) = Π1MΠ2+Π2MΠ1+Π
T
2 MΠ3
+(N− 2)Π2MΠ2+(N− 2)ΠT2 MΠ4
−
(
Π1
G
N
+
GT
N
Π3+
N− 2
N
GTΠ4
+Π2(A+
N− 1
N
G)+ (AT +
GT
N
)Π2
)
+(I− Γ
T
N
)Q
Γ
N
, (A.4)
Π2(T ) =−(I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f
Γf
N
,
and
Π˙3(t) = Π
T
2 MΠ2+Π3MΠ1+Π1MΠ3
+(N− 2)(Π4MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ4)
−
( 1
N
(ΠT2 G+G
TΠ2)
+Π3(A+
G
N
)+ (AT +
GT
N
)Π3
+
N− 2
N
(Π4G+G
TΠ4)
)
− Γ
T
N
Q
Γ
N
, (A.5)
Π3(T ) =
Γ Tf
N
Q f
Γf
N
,
and
Π˙4(t) = Π
T
2 MΠ2+Π4MΠ1+Π1MΠ4+Π3MΠ2
+ΠT2 MΠ3+(N− 3)(Π4MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ4)
−
( 1
N
(ΠT2 G+G
TΠ2+Π3G+G
TΠ3)
+Π4(A+
N− 2
N
G)+ (AT +
N− 2
N
GT )Π4
)
− Γ
T
N
Q
Γ
N
, (A.6)
Π4(T ) =
Γ Tf
N
Q f
Γf
N
.
The last two ODEs lead to
d
dt
(Π3−Π4) = (Π3−Π4)(MΠ1−MΠ2−A)
+ (Π1M−ΠT2 M−AT )(Π3−Π4),
where Π3(T )−Π4(T ) = 0. This can be viewed as a linear
ODE once Π1 and Π2 are fixed. Therefore Π3 ≡Π4 on [0,T ].
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: i) We can find a constant Cz such that
sup0≤t≤T |xz(t)| ≤Cz, and sup0<ε≤1 |zε | ≤Cz. Fix the open ball
B2Cz(0). For x,y ∈ B2Cz(0) and t ∈ [0,T ], we have
|φ(t,x)−φ(t,y)| ≤ Lip(2Cz)|x− y|.
For each ε ≤ 1, by (A1)–(A3), (17) has a solution yε(t)
defined either (a) for all t ∈ [0,T ] or (b) on a maximal interval
[0, tmax) for some 0< tmax ≤ T .
Below we show that for all small ε , (b) does not occur. We
prove by contradiction. Suppose for any small ε0 > 0, there
exists 0< ε < ε0 such that (b) occurs with the corresponding
0< tmax ≤ T . Since [0, tmax) is the maximal existence interval,
we have limt↑tmax |yε(t)|=∞ [22]. Therefore for some 0< tm <
tmax,
yε (tm) ∈ ∂B2Cz(0), (B.1)
and
yε(t) ∈ B2Cz(0), ∀ 0≤ t < tm. (B.2)
For t < tmax, we have
yε(t)− xz(t) = zε − z+
∫ t
0
ζ (τ)dτ,
where ζ (τ) = f (τ,yε (τ))+ g(ε,τ,yε (τ))− f (τ,xz(τ)). It fol-
lows from (A3) that
|ζ (τ)| = |ζ (τ)− g(ε,τ,xz(τ))+ g(ε,τ,xz(τ))|
≤ Lip(2Cz)|yε (τ)− xz(τ)|+ |g(ε,τ,xz(τ))|.
Now for 0≤ t < tm,
|yε(t)− xz(t)| ≤ |zε − z|+ δε
+
∫ t
0
Lip(2Cz)|yε (τ)− xz(τ)|dτ.
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Note that δε =
∫ T
0 |g
(
ε,τ,xz(τ)
)|dτ → 0 as ε → 0. By Gron-
wall’s lemma,
|yε (t)− xz(t)| ≤ (δε + |zε − z|)eLip(2Cz)t
for all t ≤ tm. We can find ε¯ > 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε¯ ,
(δε + |zε − z|)eLip(2Cz)T < Cz
3
.
Then for all 0 ≤ t ≤ tm, yε(t) ∈ B3Cz/2(0), which is a contra-
diction to (B.1). We conclude for all 0< ε ≤ ε¯ , yε is defined
on [0,T ]. Next, (18) follows readily.
ii) We have
yεi(t) = zεi +
∫ t
0
[
f
(
τ,yεi(τ)
)
+ g
(
ε,τ,yεi(τ)
)]
dτ, (B.3)
and
| f (τ,yεi(τ))+ g(ε,τ,yεi(τ))|
≤ Lip(C2)|yεi(τ)|+ | f (τ,0)+ g(ε,τ,0)|
≤ Lip(C2)|yεi(τ)|+C1
≤ Lip(C2)C2+C1, (B.4)
where C1 is given in (A1).
By (B.3)–(B.4), the functions {yεi(·), i ≥ 1} are uniformly
bounded and equicontinuous. By Arzela`-Ascoli theorem [53],
there exists a subsequence {yεi j (·), j ≥ 1} such that yεi j
converges to y∗ ∈C([0,T ],RK) uniformly on [0,T ], as j→∞.
Hence,
y∗(t) = z+
∫ t
0
f
(
τ,y∗(τ)
)
+ g
(
ε,τ,y∗(τ)
)
dτ
for all t ∈ [0,T ]. So (16) has a solution. 
The proof in part i) follows the method in [46, sec. 2.4] and
[49, pp. 486].
APPENDIX C
Proof of Theorem 5:
Taking Π3 = Π4 into account, we rewrite the system of
(A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) by use of a set of new variables
ΛN1 = Π1(t), Λ
N
2 = NΠ2(t), Λ
N
3 = N
2Π3(t).
Here and hereafter N is used as a superscript in various places.
This should be clear from the context. We can determine
functions gk, 1≤ k ≤ 3, and obtain
Λ˙N1 = Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
1 − (ΛN1 A+ATΛN1 )−Q
+ g1(1/N,Λ
N
1 ,Λ
N
2 ), (C.1)
ΛN1 (T ) = (I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f (I−
Γf
N
),
Λ˙N2 = Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
2 +Λ
N
2 MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
2 MΛ
N
2
− (ΛN1 G+ΛN2 (A+G)+ATΛN2 )+QΓ
+ g2(1/N,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ), (C.2)
ΛN2 (T ) =−(I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q fΓf ,
Λ˙N3 = (Λ
N
2 )
TMΛN2 +Λ
N
3 MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
3
+ΛN3 MΛ
N
2 +(Λ
N
2 )
TMΛN3
− ((ΛN2 )TG+GTΛN2 +ΛN3 (A+G)+ (AT +GT )ΛN3 )
−Γ TQΓ + g3(1/N,ΛN2 ,ΛN3 ), (C.3)
ΛN3 (T ) = Γ
T
f Q fΓf .
In particular, we can determine
g1 =
1
N
(1− 1
N
)(ΛN2 MΛ
N
2 +(Λ
N
2 )
TM(ΛN2 )
T )
− 1
N
(ΛN1 G+G
TΛN1 )−
1
N
(1− 1
N
)(ΛN2 G+G
T (ΛN2 )
T )
+
1
N
(Γ TQ+QΓ )− 1
N2
Γ TQΓ .
The expressions of g2 and g3 can be determined in a similar
way and the detail is omitted here.
Letting N → ∞ in (C.1)–(C.3), this gives a limiting ODE
system consisting of (19), (20) and (22).
If (20) has a unique solution on [0,T ], we can uniquely
solve Λ3 from a linear ODE (22). In view of g1,g2,g3 and
the terminal conditions in (C.1)–(C.3), by Theorem 4 i) and
Remark 3, there exists N0 such that for all N ≥N0, the system
(C.1)–(C.3) has a solution on [0,T ] and
sup
N≥N0,0≤t≤T
(|ΛN1 |+ |ΛN2 |+ |ΛN3 |)< ∞, (C.4)
which implies (15) and so (13). Consequently, asymptotic
solvability follows.
Conversely, if asymptotic solvability holds, there exists N0
such that the system (C.1)–(C.3) has a solution on [0,T ] for all
N ≥ N0 and (C.4) holds. By Theorem 4 ii), (20) has a unique
solution on [0,T ]. This completes the proof of Theorem 5. 
Proof of Proposition 7:
We can check that
(JT23S1, J
T
23S3, J
T
23S2, J
T
23S4, · · · ,JT23SN)
satisfies (11). Hence S1 = J
T
23S1. We can further show S1 =
JT12S2. By the method in the proof of Lemma A.1, we obtain
the representation for Si. Next, for each i we have
r˙i(t) = θ
T
1 Mθ1+ 2(N− 1)θT2 Mθ1−Tr(DTΠ1D)
−(N− 1)Tr(DTΠ3D)−ηTQη ,
ri(T ) = η
T
f Q f η f ,
and therefore r1 = · · ·= rN . 
Proof of Proposition 8:
Recalling M = BR−1BT , by Proposition 7 we derive
θ˙1(t) = Π1Mθ1+(N− 1)(Π2Mθ1+ΠT2 Mθ2)
−(AT + GT
N
)
θ1− N−1N GTθ2
+
(
I− Γ T
N
)
Qη ,
θ1(T ) =−(I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f η f ,
(C.5)
and 
θ˙2(t) =
(
ΠT2 +(N− 1)Π3
)
Mθ1
+
(
Π1+(N− 2)ΠT2
)
Mθ2− 1NGTθ1
−(AT + N−1
N
GT
)
θ2− 1NΓ TQη ,
θ2(T ) =
1
N
Γ Tf Q fη f .
(C.6)
15
Based on (C.5)–(C.6), we may write the ODEs of χN1 (t)
and χN2 (t). Under asymptotic solvability, we uniquely solve
(Λ1,Λ2,Λ3,χ1,χ2) on [0,T ]. We obtain (27) by writing the
ODE system of (ΛN1 ,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ,χ
N
1 ,χ
N
2 ) and next applying The-
orem 4. The proposition follows. 
APPENDIX D
Proof of Proposition 13:
i) If Qˆ≤ 0, (52) is the Riccati ODE in a standard optimal
control problem [49], and so has a unique solution on [0,T ].
ii) The characteristic equation of (54) has solutions λˆ1 =
aˆ+α , λˆ2 = aˆ−α , where α =
√
∆ˆ .
If α > 0, we write u=C1e
λˆ1t + eλˆ2t . Then u′ =C1λˆ1eλˆ1t +
λˆ2e
λˆ2t . By Λ2(T ) = 0, we obtain C1 =−(λˆ2/λˆ1)e−2αT and
Λ2(t) =
λˆ1λˆ2
(
eα(T−t)− e−α(T−t)
)
λˆ2e−α(T−t)− λˆ1eα(T−t)
=
Qˆ
(
eα(T−t)− e−α(T−t)
)
λˆ2e−α(T−t)− λˆ1eα(T−t)
,
which exists on [0,T ].
If α = 0, we write the solution of (54) as u=C1e
aˆt + teaˆt .
This gives u′ =C1aˆeaˆt + eaˆt + taˆeaˆt . Since Λ2(T ) = 0, C1aˆ+
1+Taˆ= 0. Therefore,
Λ2(t) =−u
′
u
=−C1aˆ+ 1+ taˆ
C1+ t
=
aˆ2(T − t)
aˆ(t−T )− 1 ,
which exists on [0,T ]. 
Proof of Proposition 14:
i) The computation is similar to the case in Proposition 13
and we omit the details.
ii) The characteristic equation of (54) has solutions λˆ1,2 =
aˆ±β i. To solve (54), we take u=C1eaˆt cosβ t+eaˆt sinβ t. Now
u′ = aˆeaˆt(C1 cosβ t+ sinβ t)+βeaˆt(−C1 sinβ t+ cosβ t).
Since Λ2(T ) = 0, we determine
C1 =
aˆsinβT +β cosβT
−aˆcosβT +β sinβT
=
cosθ sinβT + sinθ cosβT
−cosθ cosβT + sinθ sinβT
=− sin(βT +θ )
cos(βT +θ )
.
For this moment we suppose cos(βT+θ ) 6= 0 so that C1 above
is well defined. Subsequently,
C1 cosβ t+ sinβ t =
sin(β t−βT −θ )
cos(βT +θ )
,
−C1 sinβ t+ cosβ t =cos(β t−βT −θ )
cos(βT +θ )
.
Therefore,
Λ2(t) =− aˆsin(β t−βT −θ )+β cos(β t−βT −θ )
sin(β t−βT −θ )
=
√
Qˆsinβ (t−T )
sin
(
β (T − t)+θ) . (D.1)
If cos(βT +θ ) = 0 occurs, we start by taking u= eaˆt cosβ t+
C2e
aˆt sinβ t. We may determine C2 = 0 and still obtain the
same form of Λ2 as in (D.1). 
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